Strategic Analysis · FY2019–FY2025
Costco has 81 million paying members and an 89.8% worldwide renewal rate. Its e-commerce revenue grew from $6B to ~$18.9B between 2019 and 2025 — tripling — with limited marketing investment. Yet that $18.9B still represents just ~7% of total sales against 81 million members who largely shop in-store. That gap between loyalty and digital activation is the opportunity this analysis examines.
The Company
Costco does not earn its profit from selling merchandise. It earns profit from selling access — and that structural difference explains almost everything about its financial performance, its competitive moat, and its digital opportunity.
Costco operates merchandise near break-even. The margin lives in the annual membership fee — $65 for Gold Star, $130 for Executive. In FY2019, those fees totaled $3.35B. By FY2025, fees grew to $5.3B across 81 million paid members — and operating income of $10.4B means membership fees cover more than half the entire profit base.
The strategic implication: Costco does not need to maximize margin on every transaction — it needs to maximize member satisfaction. That creates an opening for digital expansion that conventional-margin retailers cannot match. A member who shops online costs nothing in incremental acquisition; they are already paying the annual fee.
The Costco Experience
To understand Costco's digital challenge, you have to understand what Costco actually sells. It isn't bulk goods. It's an experience — and the $1.50 hot dog is its most powerful marketing tool.
The Costco warehouse is designed as a one-way treasure hunt. There are no aisle signs — you navigate by instinct. Products rotate constantly: the cashmere sweater may be gone next week. This isn't inefficiency; it's strategy. The layout forces the member to pass through the entire store to get anywhere.
Kirkland represents over 25% of Costco's merchandise sales — and it's growing. These aren't generic off-brand products. Many are manufactured by the same companies that make the national brand equivalents, often to higher specs.
Beyond groceries and goods, Costco runs one of the largest travel businesses in the US — vacation packages, cruises, car rentals, and hotels, exclusively for members. It also operates optical, pharmacy, tire installation, and a gas station network (747 stations worldwide). These "ancillary" businesses are entirely absent from the typical "Costco = bulk goods" mental model — and many members have no idea they exist.
The Digital Gap
Sam's Club — Costco's most direct competitor — has made digital its core strategy. Walmart's CEO publicly called Sam's its "innovation engine." Meanwhile, Costco continues to rely on organic discovery to bring members online. That asymmetry is the central strategic problem this analysis addresses.
Costco's digital marketing spend is minimal relative to peers. Members associate Costco with the warehouse — not a platform where the same prices exist without the drive. Gabe Rivera, Front End Supervisor at Costco, confirmed this directly: "Consumers are more willing to shop [Amazon] compared to Costco online because it's what they're used to." That perception gap is the most solvable part of this problem.
Sam's Club has built scan-and-go checkout, full-scale curbside pickup, and a digital-first membership onboarding model. In online grocery market share, Sam's holds 5.1% to Costco's 1.2%. That gap widened because of deliberate, sustained investment — not an accident.
Costco's economics reward foot traffic. Members who shop exclusively online buy fewer impulse items and require fulfillment infrastructure. Management has historically prioritized warehouse visits — but younger members default to digital-first shopping regardless of management preference.
E-commerce comparable sales grew 16% in FY2024 and 20.7% in Q3 alone. Costco Logistics delivered 4.5 million items, up 29% year over year. App traffic grew 48% in Q1 FY2026. The platform works. The bottleneck is awareness, not product quality.
The Evidence
The numbers make the case more clearly than any framework. Costco's digital channel is growing fast, underfunded relative to peers, and sitting on top of a 76-million-member installed base that requires zero acquisition cost to reach.
For context: Walmart's e-commerce share has grown to nearly 18% of US sales. Target's is similar. Sam's Club — with a fraction of Costco's resources — has pushed its digital penetration above 15%. The table below makes the competitive distance visible.
The 7% figure is not a ceiling — it's a baseline set by organic growth alone. Including BOPIS (Buy Online, Pick Up In Store) and other digitally-initiated purchases, digitally-enabled sales reached ~10% of net sales in FY2025. With deliberate investment, the addressable share is far higher. The chart below quantifies what that curve looks like — and what a targeted campaign could do to it.
The highlighted row below is the outlier — the company with the strongest member loyalty in the sector and the weakest digital penetration. That combination is unusual, and it points to a marketing gap rather than a structural limitation.
| Company | E-comm % of sales | Digital strategy | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amazon | ~70% | Pure-play; logistics moat | Dominant |
| Walmart | ~18% | Omnichannel at scale | Advancing |
| Target | ~18% | Drive-up; strong app | Advancing |
| Sam's Club | ~15% | Scan-and-go; digital-first membership | Investing heavily |
| Costco | ~7% | Organic; limited marketing | Underweight |
| BJ's Wholesale | ~5% | BOPIS investment; smaller scale | Catching up |
Sources: company filings, Digital Commerce 360, Nasdaq. FY2024 estimates.
Validation
Claims about member awareness, competitive position, and online behavior require evidence — not just intuition. Here is what the primary and secondary research shows.
Costco's own quarterly filings reveal the disconnect: e-commerce site traffic grew 27% in Q4 FY2025 and app traffic grew 45% in Q1 FY2026 — yet e-commerce remains ~7% of net sales. Members are browsing, not buying. CFO Gary Millerchip attributed renewal rate dips directly to online cohorts, saying on the Q1 FY2025 earnings call: "Renewal rates are down slightly as it attracts more new members through digital channels. Those signups tend to renew at a slightly lower rate." High curiosity, low conversion, weaker retention — the pattern points to an awareness and onboarding gap, not a product gap.
Morningstar analyst Brett Husslein, in a March 2026 note, wrote that Costco's "expanding profitability and membership loyalty reinforce its wide moat" while flagging that the 20-basis-point dip in US/Canada renewals "will begin to stabilize over the midterm as Costco improves its targeted retention capabilities among digitally acquired younger members." Morningstar maintains Costco's Wide Moat rating, but identifies digital retention of younger cohorts as the key variable to watch over the next three to five years.
CEO Ron Vachris told U.S. News in November 2025 that Costco is "considering ways to improve the member experience, such as expanding the company's digital presence" — but added the constraint that "whatever Vachris does, it must be consistent with what people expect from Costco — its value-for-money and its core values." He also reaffirmed to investors: "Being competitive on pricing is part of our everyday DNA." The challenge is not whether to go digital — it is how to do it without compromising the brand promises that make Costco irreplaceable.
Sam's Club invested in digital in 2019–2021. By FY2023, its e-commerce share exceeded 15% vs. Costco's ~7%. Same warehouse club model, same demographics, different digital commitment. The performance gap is not explained by product quality or pricing — it is explained entirely by deliberate marketing and digital UX investment. Sam's Club is the closest thing to a controlled experiment Costco has.
CFO Gary Millerchip was explicit on the Q2 FY2025 earnings call: "The decline in renewal rates was largely attributable to a higher number of online sign-ups entering the renewal rate, and this quarter included a large Groupon campaign in December 2023 entering the calculation." On the Q4 FY2025 call, he added: "The decline is primarily due to online sign-ups that renew at a slightly lower rate. We foresee a few more quarters of similar impacts." This is not speculation — management has identified online acquisition without retention as an active risk to the membership fee model.
Inflation-driven value-seeking brought large numbers of Millennial and Gen Z shoppers to Costco in FY2022–2023. Costco's own investor communications reference "new member cohorts with higher digital expectations." These members default to digital-first. Without a digital activation strategy, Costco risks winning their physical visit but losing their digital wallet share to Amazon Prime — which charges $139/year and is entirely digital-native.
We interviewed Gabe Rivera, a Front End Supervisor at Costco Wholesale. His responses confirm this analysis's core claims from the inside:
Source: Primary interview with Gabe Rivera, Front End Supervisor, Costco Wholesale, 2025.
The Price Paradox
Members who discover Costco.com often notice the same item costs more online. This isn't a mistake — it's structural. Understanding it is essential to evaluating any digital strategy.
In-store, the member does all the logistics: drives to the warehouse, loads the cart, drives home. Online requires Costco to pick, pack, and ship — often items weighing 30–80 lbs. That cost is embedded in the online price. For the $1.50 hot dog or a 40-pack of paper towels, the in-store model is simply cheaper to operate.
Costco warehouses stock under 4,000 SKUs — the fastest-moving bulk items at maximum negotiated volume. Costco.com carries 9,000–10,000 SKUs, including specialty, oversized, and made-to-order items that never appear in stores. These naturally carry higher per-unit costs. The comparison of "same item, higher price online" often involves different configurations entirely.
Costco's management has historically priced online higher to avoid cannibalizing warehouse visits — the engine of impulse purchasing and the "treasure hunt" experience. A member who buys paper towels online removes one reason to visit the warehouse. The price differential is a deliberate friction point, not an oversight.
The price gap is a real strategic constraint. Any digital push that doesn't address it will underperform — members who go online, find prices higher, and return to the store are not being served by the digital channel. This creates a clear framework for what should and shouldn't move online:
| Category | Online pricing | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Appliances, Furniture, Electronics | Competitive | Bulky — members prefer delivery. No traffic loss. |
| Costco Travel, Auto | Online only | Can't buy in-store. Digital is the only channel. |
| Kirkland specialty items | Near parity | Exclusive brand reduces substitution risk. |
| Consumables, Groceries | Always higher | Protect warehouse trips for high-frequency visits. |
| $1.50 hot dog | Never online | In-store icon. Pricing it online would break the myth. |
Strategic targeting of online categories is the prerequisite to any digital awareness campaign.
Strategic Context
The forces shaping Costco's competitive environment have shifted in ways that make the digital gap both more dangerous and more addressable than it was five years ago.
Five forces shape the competitive logic of warehouse retail — and each one is shifting in ways that make Costco's digital underinvestment a more urgent strategic risk than it was in 2019.
No traditional retailer can replicate Costco's scale. But digital-native entrants — Amazon, Temu — can target Costco's members online without a single warehouse, competing for the digital attention Costco is not yet claiming.
Existing members have low price sensitivity. But Millennials and Gen Z carry higher digital expectations and are more willing to comparison-shop online. Costco risks becoming a "parents' retailer" unless it builds a credible digital experience for this cohort.
Costco's scale gives it extraordinary supplier leverage. This extends to digital: exclusive online deals and digital-only SKUs are realistic strategies suppliers would welcome given Costco's traffic volume. A stronger online platform amplifies an advantage that already exists.
Amazon Prime is the closest structural substitute to Costco's membership model — and it is digital-first. The risk is not that warehouse regulars defect. It is that the next generation never forms the in-store habit at all, choosing Prime as their default "membership" before Costco's digital channel earns their attention.
Sam's Club is Costco's most direct digital threat. Backed by Walmart's full technology investment, it has made scan-and-go, curbside, and digital membership its core strategy. The longer Costco waits, the wider the digital loyalty gap becomes in the segment that matters most: first-time, younger members.
92.9% US/Canada renewal rate is a captive audience at near-zero acquisition cost. Kirkland Signature creates a reason to shop Costco digitally rather than substituting with Amazon. First-party member data across every transaction is a marketing asset most retailers paid billions to build. Instacart partnership already provides last-mile grocery infrastructure.
Digital marketing budget minimal compared to Walmart and Sam's Club. Online prices have historically been higher than in-store, creating a perception barrier. Limited BOPIS capability relative to Sam's Club. Brand awareness for the online channel is effectively zero among most existing members — the core problem this analysis addresses.
76 million already-paying members — the lowest-cost digital audience in retail. E-commerce growing 16–20% annually with limited marketing support. Executive members (74%+ of sales) are high-income and digitally capable. Costco's app grew 48% in traffic in Q1 FY2026 — infrastructure that already works and just needs audience directed to it.
Sam's Club investing aggressively in digital with Walmart's full technology backing. Amazon Prime offers a competing "membership" model that is entirely digital-native. Online members renewing at slightly lower rates is an early warning — if digital acquisition continues without improving retention, renewal rate erosion could undermine the fee-based profit model.
Assessing Costco's internal capabilities against what digital expansion requires — identifying durable advantages and critical gaps.
Costco's closed membership system ties 100% of purchases to a member identity. In an era of cookie deprecation and privacy regulation, this first-party data is worth more than it has ever been. It is the foundation of any personalized digital campaign — and no competitor can replicate it without an equivalent membership model.
No competitor has come close to replicating Kirkland. It drives higher margins online than branded equivalents — critically, it is a reason to shop Costco digitally rather than substituting on Amazon. A campaign centered on Kirkland exclusivity would be the strongest possible message.
Costco Logistics delivered 4.5 million items in FY2024, up 29%. The Instacart partnership provides grocery last-mile. Both are improving, but remain nascent relative to Walmart's 4,600-store network. The advantage is real but requires sustained investment before the window closes.
Costco's digital marketing spend and sophistication trail all major peers. Its own data shows Meta drives 93.4% of social checkout traffic — yet that channel is largely underinvested. This is the clearest gap to close: not technology, not product, not pricing — it is the marketing capability to deploy the assets Costco already owns.
The macro environment has shifted in ways that make this moment well-suited for Costco to invest in digital activation — several tailwinds are converging simultaneously.
The deprecation of third-party cookies and tightening privacy regulation have raised the value of owned member data. Costco's closed-loop membership system is structurally positioned for this environment. Every major competitor is spending billions to acquire what Costco already has. Activating it for digital marketing is the obvious next step.
Inflation-driven value-seeking behavior brought Millennial and Gen Z consumers to Costco in large numbers during FY2022–2023. Many shopped in-store but never discovered the online channel. These members' loyalty is still forming — a digital campaign to this cohort, while the relationship is new, carries disproportionately high long-term ROI.
Millennials and Gen Z shop digitally first and physically second. A retailer without a credible digital channel is perceived as incomplete regardless of its physical experience. Costco's in-store-first model risks being coded as "for parents" unless digital marketing actively reframes that narrative.
If Costco waits another 3–5 years to invest meaningfully in digital awareness, Sam's Club may have established enough digital loyalty among the key 25–40 demographic that the window closes permanently. The competitive clock — not Costco's readiness — is the binding constraint on timing.
Our Recommendation
Costco already sells online — the app is integrated, members receive mailers, and the platform is growing. The question is how to grow it without undermining the in-store treasure hunt that defines the brand. Costco should not try to become Amazon. It should run a targeted digital awareness campaign aimed at its existing 81 million members — turning passive cardholders into active online shoppers, without disrupting the warehouse experience that built the brand.
The most fundamental step: a deliberate, funded campaign making members aware that Costco.com offers warehouse prices with home delivery.
Costco's CFO has already flagged that online members renew at lower rates. Phase 2 closes that gap before it becomes structural.
Costco already has the member data. Phase 3 builds the infrastructure to deploy it at scale.
Costco already has every ingredient needed to win online: 81 million loyal members, the most trusted private label in retail, a growing logistics network, and an e-commerce platform that delivered 15.6% annual comp growth in FY2025 without advertising support. The risk to this model is not that digital kills in-store — it is that Costco waits too long and cedes the digital habit to Amazon Prime among the next generation of members. The recommendation is precise: target big-ticket, low-cannibalization categories first; protect the treasure hunt; and finally tell the 81 million members paying annually that the platform exists.
Sources & Citations